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After joining the the euro, several countries with a history of high ination (notable examples
include Greece and Italy) experienced sharp reductions in ination together with a prolonged build
up of sovereign debt. In this paper we propose a rationalization for this phenomenon. To do so,
we explore the interaction between ination credibility and the debt dynamics that arise when
an impatient sovereign issues nominal bonds. We are particularly interested in the impact of
an increase in ination credibility, achieved either through better policies and institutions or by
leveraging the higher ination credibility of other countries via a currency union. We show that an
increase in ination credibility delivers an invitation to borrow, raising the maximum borrowing
limit of the country and reducing any incentive to save.
Conditional on a nominal interest rate, the government has an ex post incentive to inate away
the real value of its bonds. However, creditors anticipate this temptation ex ante, pricing the ex
post ination into the nominal interest rate. The country therefore bears the cost of high ination
with no reduction of debt in real terms. Including the costs associated with ex post ination, a
country with low ination credibility will bear a greater burden from a given level of debt.
In such a scenario the government has an incentive to save and reduce debt over time to a level
that eliminates the temptation to inate. On the other hand, if the government is impatient relative
to the market interest rate, it has an incentive to borrow and increase debt over time. This conict
between `impatience' and `saving to escape ination' generates a cut-o level of debt below which
the government will save and above which, it will borrow. That is, debt dynamics diverge around
this cut-o, to the left of which debt shrinks and to the right of which debt grows.
One way to think about the above is through the elasticity of the nominal interest rate to debt
levels. As the government accumulates debt, its nominal interest increases, reecting the increase
in the temptation to inate. That positive elasticity can be high enough to stop the country from
accumulating more debt at the margin, and thus it generates an endogenous force that breaks the
borrowing dynamics generated by impatience.
When ination credibility is high, and, as a result, the government is not tempted to inate,
then this elasticity force is reduced. As a result, the government borrows over time all the way
up to its maximum debt limit. There is a range of debt levels over which the government will
choose to save and reduce debt over time in a low ination credibility regime but choose to borrow
and increase debt over time in a high ination credibility regime. That is, a switch from low to
high ination credibility can turn governments from savers to borrowers.1 In this sense we can
rationalize why a country that gains the higher ination commitment of a monetary union can end
up with a sovereign borrowing boom, as was witnessed for some countries in the euro zone.2
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1Importantly, ination credibility is desirable from the perspective of the government. Indeed the sovereign is always better
o when it has higher ination credibility.
2More generally the interaction between ination credibility and debt dynamics is important to understand why emerging
markets historically borrowed exclusively in foreign currency, so called \original sin" (Eichengreen and Hausmann (2009)) and
the more recent phenomenon of a decline in original sin as countries have managed to control ination (Du and Schreger (2013)).
Rebelo and Vegh (1995) also analyze the impact of ination stabilizations on debt and output.
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I. Environment
The environment builds on the small open economy set up used in Aguiar et al. (2012) while
introducing impatience to the government objective function. Time is continuous, the small open
economy receives a constant endowment y and issues nominal debt at interest rate rt. The gov-
ernment chooses consumption and ination and the price level evolves according to Pt = P(t) =
P(0)e
R t
0 (t)dt, where (t) denotes the rate of ination at time t. We assume P(0) is pre-determined,
and given the assumed continuity of P(t) we can express the government's problem taking real debt
b(t) as the state variable.
We assume that the government lacks commitment, and analyze its decisions over time as a
dynamic game. As in Aguiar et al. (2012), we focus attention on recursive equilibria, such that, when
the government makes its optimal choices of ination and consumption, it takes the equilibrium
interest rate schedule, r(b), as given. The maximization problem is then:
V (b0) = max
c(t);(t)
Z 1
0
e t (u(c(t))    (t))dt (P1)
subject to:
_ b(t) = c(t) + (r(b(t))   (t))b(t)   y
b(t) 2 
  [0;bmax];
where the set 
 is to be determined in equilibrium. Note that we write the government's problem
in sequence form, despite the lack of commitment to ination policies. However, the government's
problem is conditional on the equilibrium interest schedule r(b); conditional on this schedule, the
government has no conict between ination chosen as of t = 0 and that chosen period-by-period.
The role of ination as a partial default mechanism can be seen in the budget constraint expressed
in real terms. The cost of ination is modeled in reduced form as a deadweight welfare cost  (t).
To keep the problem tractable we assume a linear ination cost and restrict  2 [0;  ].
While we do not micro-found preferences over ination, a natural interpretation is that   is a
reduced-form proxy for a reputational cost to the government of ination. A large cost represents
an environment in which the government has a relatively strong incentive for (or commitment
to) low ination. T When performing comparative statics with respect to  , we have in mind
institutional features of monetary and scal policy that vary across countries, such as the extent
of ination indexing in the private sector and the exibility of prices; the political economy that
governs the interaction of monetary and scal policy; the legislative mandate of the central bank
and how readily this can be amended; and the ability to raise revenue through taxation in a
non-distortionary manner.
Limited commitment manifests itself along two related dimensions. First, the government cannot
commit to repaying its debt. If it defaults it enters autarky on a permanent basis and the welfare
associated with autarky is V = u((1   )y)= where   1 captures any additional output costs
associated with default. To ensure that the government has an incentive to repay its debt in
equilibrium, it must be that V (b)  V for all b 2 
. Given that V will be monotone in debt, the
equality V (bmax) = V pins down the maximum debt limit bmax above which lenders will refuse to
lend at any positive price. Second, the government cannot commit to an ination and debt path,
which is implicitly captured in the above problem by the fact that the government takes the interest
rate schedule as given.
The lenders are assumed to be risk-neutral and in (a perfect foresight) equilibrium the interest
rate schedule must satisfy the break-even condition:
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where r? is the real return on the outside option for the lenders and where (b) is the equilibrium
ination policy (that is, the ination policy that solves the governments problem above). We will
assume that r(b) satises the conditions of Denition 1 of Aguiar et al. (2012). In particular, in
the equilibrium we will construct, r(b) will have a point of discontinuity.
Assumption:  > r?. Dierently from Aguiar et al. (2013), we assume that the government is
impatient so that the discount rate exceeds the real interest rate r? (the case of  = r? is analyzed
in Aguiar et al. (2012)). We can then dene a Recursive Competitive Equilibrium exactly as in
Denition 2 of Aguiar et al. (2013).
Let us now consider the solution to the government's problem (P1) for a given interest rate
schedule. Dene the following function:
H(b;q) = max
fc;2[0; ]g
fu(c)     + q(c + (r(b)   )b   y)g
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is given by: V (b)   H(b;V 0(b)) = 0.
We face two problems when trying to solve the HJB equation. First, the value function itself
is not necessarily dierentiable, implying there may not be a classical solution to the HJB. And
second, the interest rate schedule is not continuous, rendering the H function discontinuous in b.
However, in Aguiar et al. (2012) Denition 3, we show that the value function is the unique bounded
continuous viscosity solution of the HJB, using the denition of viscosity solution of Bressan and
Hong (2007). We will proceed in a similar fashion here.
As in Aguiar et al. (2012), we focus attention on monotone equilibria, and in particular, equilibria
where the interest rate schedule is a step function. That is, for some b, to be determined below,
the interest rate schedule is:
r(b) =
(
r? for b  b;
r? +   for b > b;
reecting that equilibrium ination, as a result of the linear ination costs, will be a step function
as well.
At points of dierentiability of the value function and continuity of the interest rate schedule, the
conditions in Denition 3 of Aguiar et al. (2013) boil down to the classical HJB equation. From
there we can obtain the standard rst order conditions:
u0(c) =  V 0(b) (FOC)
 =
8
> <
> :
0 if   V 0(b)b <  
[0;  ] if   V 0(b)b =  
  if   V 0(b)b >  :
The rst condition equates the marginal cost of debt to the negative of the marginal utility of
consumption. The second condition states that ination will be high when the marginal utility of
consumption is high or debt is high. This reects that the government has two ways of servicing
nominal debt, saving and inating. A high marginal utility of consumption (relative to  ) favors
inating. Similarly, as the cost of inating is independent of b while the benets are increasing, a
high stock of nominal bonds favors inating.
As discussed in Aguiar et al. (2012) there are in principle multiple values of b that are consistent
with equilibrium. As in that paper, we further narrow attention to the best monotone equilibrium,
that is, the equilibrium with the largest b.3 We proceed now to construct it.
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II. Construction of the Equilibrium Solution: Low Ination Credibility
An equilibrium consists of an interest rate schedule that satises (L1) and a value function that is
a viscosity solution to the HJB. As noted above, the candidate r(b) is a step functions characterized
by a threshold b and a maximum debt level bmax. Conditional on fb;bmaxg, the equilibrium value
function is the unique viscosity solution to HJB. The uniqueness result discussed in Aguiar et al.
(2012) is of particular value in this regard; namely, once we nd a solution to the HJB, we know that
it is the equilibrium value function associated with the candidate r(b). We proceed by conjecturing
an equilibrium and then verify it satises the HJB and the lenders' break-even conditions.
The conjectured equilibrium uses the following logic. For low enough values of debt, the govern-
ment has no incentive to inate and faces a low nominal interest rate. There is no reason for the
government not to borrow, given its relative impatience. The question becomes more interesting
at and above the threshold b. The higher nominal interest rate may discourage increasing debt
beyond b, and conditional on b > b, may induce saving. We shall keep these issues in mind as we
construct the value function.
We can construct a conjectured equilibrium starting with b. In particular, suppose the jump
in interest rate at b is sucient that the government does not borrow at this threshold. In this
case, _ b = 0 and the associated consumption is C(b) = y   r?b. For low ination to be optimal,
the rst-order conditions require u0(y   r?b)b   . This expression evaluated at equality pins
down the maximum b that can be sustained conditional on _ b = 0. The associated value is
V (b) = u(y   r?b)=. For debt levels below b, the government will borrow up to the threshold.
We can ll in the value function for b < b using the HJB. In particular, the HJB implies that
V (b) satises an ordinary dierential equation with the boundary condition V (b). Note that the
dierential equation denes V 0(b) implicitly. However, the strict convexity of H(b;V 0) in V 0 implies
that conditional on V (b), there are only two possible values of V 0(b) which satisfy the HJB, one
which implies _ b > 0 and one which implies _ b < 0. For b < b, the \borrowing" solution is the
appropriate V 0(b).
For b > b, the government faces a choice. It can save in order to capture the low interest rate
(and associated low ination policy) that holds at b. Conversely, it can continue to borrow up to
its maximum debt level. The value from saving can be obtained from the HJB extended rightward
from b under the conjecture (b) =   for b > b. That is, V (b) satises the HJB with boundary
condition V (b), but now we follow the \saving" solution for V 0(b). On the other hand, if the
government were to borrow, it will accumulate debt up to bmax. The value of this policy can be
obtained by solving the HJB from bmax. In particular, at bmax, we have _ b = 0, as the government
cannot exceed the borrowing limit. The associated value is V (bmax) =
u(y r?bmax)   
 . As this
is the borrowing limit at which the government is indierent to repayment or default, we have
V (bmax) = V , pinning down the value of bmax assuming _ b = 0. Given this boundary condition, the
HJB can be solved to ll in the value for b < bmax.
We therefore have two candidate values for each b 2 (b;bmax), one associated with saving towards
b and the other associate with borrowing to bmax. Let b? denote the point at which they intersect.
If such a point exists, then the optimal policy is to save for b 2 (b;b?] and borrow for b > b?. In
what follows, we shall consider parameterizations that ensure that such a point exists.4
The conjectured value function links the segments dened over [0;b], (b;b?], (b?;bmax]. The
boundary conditions ensure that the proposed value function is continuous, and it solves the HJB
at each point by construction. The solution must also satisfy the conjecture that (b) =   for
4More generally, we are characterizing an equilibrium such that b and bmax are points of stationarity. Below we present
a numerical parameterization in which this conjecture is veried. With other parameterizations, there exist other possible
equilibria that can be found with the same algorithm. In particular, suppose that b is a stationary point, but that it is optimal
to save from bmax to b. In this case, the savings solution extended to the right of b and evaluated at bmax lies above the
steady state value. Similarly, if the borrowing solution extended to the left of bmax lies above the stationary value at b, then
it is optimal to borrow to bmax from all points in 
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b > b, which can be veried by checking V 0(b)b    at each point b > b. Note that the
value function features two points of non-dierentiability, b and b?. It is at these points that the
viscosity conditions must be veried. The resulting consumption policy will be discontinuous at
those two points as well (see below in the numerical characterization). In particular, even though
the government is more impatient than the foreign markets, the government is saving in a region
to the right b (that is, _ b < 0 for (b;b?]). This arises from the desire to reduce the equilibrium
ination rate. To see this, note that to the right of b, the government is choosing high ination
(consistent with the equilibrium). However, by saving just a bit, the government is able to bring
the debt level down to b, a debt level consistent with zero ination. By choosing to do this, in
eect, the government is achieving commitment to low ination by lowering its debt. Note that for
b suciently higher than b, the incentives switch: the government then gives up on the desire to
commit to low ination through savings (this is just too costly now), and instead just borrows up
to the maximum level, while inating along the way.
III. Construction of the Equilibrium Solution: High Ination Credibility
We also construct an equilibrium when ination credibility is so high that the government never
inates in equilibrium (that is, the value of   is suciently high to rule out ination for all equi-
librium levels of debt). In this case, the equilibrium interest rate schedule will be just r?, and the
HJB can be solved in the standard way. In this case bmax remains a stationary point, and thus
V (bmax) = u(y   r?bmax)=, and bmax is dened by u(y   r?bmax)= = V . Note that this implies
that the following condition   > u0(y   r?bmax)bmax represents a lower bound on   in this case.
Given this boundary condition, the value function satises the HJB such that _ b > 0 for b < bmax.
Note that in this case, the country always borrows its way to the maximum debt possible. There
is no savings region, and no other stationary value: the removal of the temptation to inate also
eliminates an endogenous force that puts a break on the desire to borrow to the maximum. Note
as well that the amount of borrowing that can be sustained in this case, bmax, is greater than when
ination credibility is low. This arises because ination credibility reduces the incentive to default,
as debt is no longer associated with high equilibrium ination. In the next section, we compare
numerical solutions to the HJB in the two cases above for parameters such that the solutions just
described exist.
IV. Ination credibility
The left panel of Figure 1 compares the consumption policy function for the case when ination
credibility is low,  1, to that when ination credibility is high  2.
In the case of  2, ination costs are high enough so that ination is throughout zero. In the case of
 1, ination costs are low enough that b < bmax exists. As discussed previously, the consumption
policy function for  1 is then characterized by a region of borrowing, 0 < b < b; 1, followed by a
region of saving b; 1 < b < b?
 1 and then another region of borrowing b?
 1 < b < bmax; 1, as marked
in the left panel of Figure 1.
Also as discussed previously, for  2 since there is no incentive to save, consumption is forever
decreasing and debt is forever increasing until the debt limit is reached.
There are two interesting features to this comparison. The debt limit for  2 exceeds that for  1
and in the region b; 1 < b < b?
 1 the country saves in the low ination cost environment while
borrowing in the high ination cost environment. The value functions are depicted in the right
panel of Figure 1. As can be seen, the country is always better o in a high ination cost versus
low ination cost environment.6 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW MONTH YEAR
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Figure 1. Left panel: the solid thick black line is the consumption policy function for  1; the dashed thick gray
line is the consumption policy function for  2; and the dotted thin line is the stationary consumption value,
c = y   r?b. Right panel: the solid thick black line is the value function for  1; and the dashed thick gray line
is the value function for  2. The parameters in both panels are u = log, r = 0:06,  = 0:07, y = 1,  1 = 0:2,   = 0:2,
 = 0:1547, and  2 sufficiently high.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we explore the interaction between ination credibility and impatience in determin-
ing debt dynamics and debt limits. We show that this interaction can rationalize why a country
that attains higher ination credibility by joining a monetary union5, all else equal, can experience
a build up of sovereign debt as has been documented for countries like Greece on joining the euro.
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